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ESSAY
RECASTING BEHAVIOR: AN ESSAY FOR
BEGINNING LAW STUDENTSt
Robert Heidt *
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Projectionist, roll the film please:
Fade In
Five people walk into an open and uncrowded public park in the
afternoon. One sets a stepstool on a pathway, ascends the stepstool, and
begins to criticize U.S. foreign policy and to urge listeners to resist that
policy. A small crowd gathers. Shouts hostile to the person on the step-
stool emerge from the crowd. Shouts hostile to those shouts emerge from
others in the crowd. A policeman on the scene arrests the person on the
stepstool, directs her to a police car, and drives her away.
Dissolve
What did we just see? How do we describe what the person on
the stepstool did?
To her attorney, she merely exercised her constitutionally pro-
tected right to free speech. All she did was talk. She didn't hit,
touch, or threaten. She didn't even use "fighting words."' If any
crimes or civil violations occurred, they were the illegal arrest com-
mitted by the police who should have protected, rather than arrested
her, and the assaults and emotional distress torts committed by any-
one in the crowd who threatened or outrageously insulted her.
To the prosecutors, she breached the peace, incited to riot, and
engaged in disorderly conduct in violation of a local ordinance, a fed-
eral statute, and a state statute, respectively. She may also have ob-
structed a public right of way, committed a public nuisance, and
participated in an unlawful assembly. Because she came in a group,
t Copyright © 1988, University of Pittsburgh Law Review.
* Charles L. Whistler Professor of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington).
1. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) ("'[Fighting' words-those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" are
not protected by the first amendment.).
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she probably also violated the separate laws against conspiring to
commit these offenses. Alternatively, she may have only attempted
each offense. A more ambitious prosecutor might describe her com-
ments about the need for each person to resist our foreign policy as
"soliciting" a crime, say for example, a violation of the draft registra-
tion law.2 An even more ambitious prosecutor might say she con-
spired to, and attempted to, overthrow the government.
A passerby accidentally injured when the crowd dispersed, or
when the crowd's presence blocked the pathway, would describe what
she did differently. To the passerby, she negligently caused physical
injury.3 After all, by foreseeably gathering the crowd, she increased
the risk that the passerby would suffer the injury he did. Likewise, a
listener intentionally injured by a member of the crowd might de-
scribe her conduct as negligent use of language which foreseeably an-
gered the one who struck him.4 To a passerby frightened by the scene
and by the shouts, but not physically injured, she committed the tort
of negligent infliction of emotional distress.5 A listener indirectly re-
ferred to and criticized by her remarks might describe her behavior as
slander or, failing that, intentional infliction of emotional distress.
These examples barely scratch the surface of the possible descrip-
tions of what the woman in the park did. If she was profane, she may
be guilty of obscenity. If she called for a strike, she may have com-
mitted an unfair labor practice. If she called for a boycott, she may
have conspired to restrain trade. If she spoke loudly, she may have
violated a noise ordinance. If she or her friends handed out leaflets,
we may describe what she did as littering. Depending on the earlier
or later actions of the others with her, her speech may constitute a
sufficient overt act to convict her of conspiracy to violate the civil
rights of another, conspiracy to commit murder, or conspiracy to
2. See United States v. Spoek, 416 F.2d 165 (Ist Cir. 1969). See generally Note, Products
Liability and the First Amendment: The Liability of Publishers for Failure to Warn, 59 IND. L.J. 503
(1984).
3. Eg., Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 42 (1975) ("The First
Amendment does not sanction the [negligent] infliction of physical injury merely because achieved
by word, rather than act.")
4. See, eg., Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune, 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
5. See, eg., Parnell v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Mich. 1983); Hyde v.
City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 271 (Mo. App. 1982), cert denied sub nor. Tribune Publishing
Co. v. Hyde, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); Rubinstein v. New York Post, 128 Misc. 2d 1, 488 N.Y.S.2d 331
(1985). See also Blinick v. Long Island Daily Press Publishing Co., 67 Misc. 2d 254, 323 N.Y.S.2d
859 (1972).
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commit any number of other crimes or civil violations. 6 Had this not
been a largely unregulated public park, she might also have violated a
host of permit laws as well as other laws regulating the time, place
and manner of such expression. 7
My goal is not to discuss whether these various claims would
necessarily succeed but to awaken you to the many different ways a
lawyer can recast, that is, describe, phenomena. Our language and
our law are wonderfully rich for this purpose. As an aspiring lawyer,
you want to cultivate your capacity to recast phenomena in as many
different ways as possible. You cannot rely on your client for this. It
is part of your job. The client may bring you the phenomena. The
client may, in effect, show you the film excerpt we've just seen. But it
is up to you, the lawyer, to conceive the different recastings, the differ-
ent descriptions of phenomena, the different stories that can be told
and to present the one most helpful for your client. It is to you as
future storytellers, therefore, that this Essay is addressed.
Typically, a story of what occurred will not resolve the case im-
mediately. Rather, it frames and identifies the central issues. Thus,
the disorderly conduct story or the restraint of trade story identify the
key issues to be whether the elements of those offenses exist, or more
precisely, whether a sensible jury could find the elements of those of-
fenses. Although these issues are left to be resolved, our description
of what occurred may still largely predetermine, and manipulate, the
outcome. Indeed by leaving the decisionmaker to resolve whether the
elements exist (inquiries that, given a sound story, can only be re-
solved in our favor), our description may seduce the decisionmaker
into overlooking the extent to which he is being manipulated.
For some of you, recasting behavior to suit your client's purpose
is second nature. You might think I am wasting paper to encourage
you to do what comes so naturally. But occasionally a beginning law
student gets "stuck" on one or two conceptualizations and blinds
himself to the others. He slips into the false assumption that phenom-
6. See, eg., New York v. Epton, 19 N.Y.2d 496, 227 N.E.2d 829, 281 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1967), aff'g
27 A.D.2d 6451, 276 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1966) (protected speech can be the "overt act" of a conspiracy
charge). See also Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (mere membership in organization
engaged in illegal advocacy will support conviction for conspiring to engage in illegal advocacy);
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (1 th Cir. 1984)
(conspiracy to commit murder based on mere presence when words were spoken by co-conspirator),
cert denied, 471 U.S. 1137.
7. See generally Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Me-
tromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
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ena are phenomena, facts are facts, and that they can be, or ought to
be, described in just a couple ways. It is easy to get stuck. As a begin-
ning student and a first amendment fan, I would have insisted that
what we saw could only be described as speech that either was or was
not constitutionally protected. That description was the ballgame.
With that description the only issue left was whether the speaker's
statements amounted to lawful or unlawful advocacy. Of course, law
exists on that issue. I would have read the cases, judged correctly
(let's assume) that under their standards this was clearly lawful advo-
cacy,8 and thought I was done.
Such thinking is incompetent thinking. If anyone had been hurt
by it, I would have been guilty of malpractice. For starters, I would
have overlooked one of the oldest rhetorical moves, rhetorical tricks if
you will, that each lawyer must include in his repertoire. When you
cannot win under one description of events, change the description;
tell another story. Because constitutionally protected speech cannot
be the key element of a crime in itself, attack it indirectly; charge
some other crime with different elements, and use the speech as evi-
dence of those elements. After all, as long as the unpopular speech
gets before the jury as evidence, it is likely to turn the jury against the
speaker, thereby assisting you, the prosecutor, nearly as much as if
the speech were criminal in itself.9
This rhetorical move whereby conduct that cannot readily be at-
tacked as unlawful in itself is used as evidence of some other crime or
civil wrong that can be attacked appears throughout the law.
Although this particular rhetorical move is just one of many made
possible by recasting behavior, I wish to focus on it because too many
students fail to stay alert to it.
I. AN EXAMPLE OF RECASTING BEHAVIOR: USING PROTECTED
CONDUCT As EVIDENCE OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT
One use of this rhetorical move came in the famous labor case
8. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (advocacy only unlawful when it creates immi-
nent danger of serious unlawful activities).
9. Admittedly, I should not speak of defendant's "conduct in itself" as if to contrast it with
any other description of defendant's conduct. The proper description of defendant's conduct is, of
course, the key question. To say, for instance, that the speaker's conduct itself in our film excerpt is
"speech" rather than "disorderly conduct" begs that question. Both descriptions of her conduct are
equally valid. My only defense for using a question-begging concept like "the actor's conduct itself"
is that I cannot find a better one to refer only to the actor's physical action, ignoring his intent and
his action's consequences.
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Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. 10 In Giboney, a union seeking to
organize peddlers set up a picket line around a dealer. The picketing
was at all times peaceful and good-natured. The union members
never obstructed customers or other individuals going through the
picket lines. Nor did this dispute, or any related dispute, feature a
background of prior violence. Moreover, the Supreme Court had re-
cently recognized in Thornhill v. Alabama 11 that peaceful picketing
was constitutionally protected as free speech under the first amend-
ment. The sweeping language of Thornhill suggested that picketing
such as the union's deserved the fullest protection that the judiciary
could provide. 12
Should the union attorney have felt secure? Absolutely not. The
state recast the picketing as a "conspiracy in restraint of trade," a
crime whose sole element is an agreement among the picketers to re-
strain trade. This element was satisfied by finding the obvious,
namely, that the picketers agreed with each other to picket with the
intent to induce the dealer to stop dealing with nonunion peddlers.
That recasting, that reconceptualization of the picketers' con-
duct, which all "appellate courts accepted, sidestepped entirely the first
amendment defense. Recasting extinguished any need for the Court
10. 336 U.S. 490 (1946). See Welch v. APA, 1986-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 67,037, at 62,373
(first amendment does not protect acts found to be illegal under the antitrust laws).
11. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
12. The Thornhill Court struck down an anti-picketing statute with the following words:
The range of activities proscribed by [the anti-picketing statute], whether character-
ized as picketing or loitering or otherwise, embraces nearly every practicable, effective
means whereby those interested-including the employees directly affected-may en-
lighten the public on the nature and causes of a labor dispute. The safeguarding of these
means is essential to the securing of an informed and educated public opinion with respect
to a matter which is of public concern. It may be that effective exercise of the means of
advancing public knowledge may persuade some of those reached to refrain from entering
into advantageous relations with the business establishment which is the scene of the dis-
pute. Every expression of opinion on matters that are important has the potentiality of
inducing action in the interests of one rather than another group in society. But the group
in power at any moment may not impose penal sanctions on peaceful and truthful discus-
sion of matters of public interest merely on a showing that others may thereby be per-
suaded to take action inconsistent with its interests. Abridgment of the liberty of such
discussion can be justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under
circumstances affording no opportunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for ac-
ceptance in the market of public opinion....
... But no clear and present danger of destruction of life or property, or invasion of
the right of privacy, or breach of the peace can be thought to be inherent in the activities of
every person who approaches the premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a
labor dispute involving the latter.
IM. at 104-05.
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to balance first amendment values against the values reflected in the
restraint of trade law. Recasting even extinguished the need to ac-
knowledge the first amendment values as a factor. The constitutional
protection given the method by which the picketers committed the
restraint of trade crime did not matter at all. Nor did it matter that
the evidence from which the restraint of trade was inferred consisted
of the same constitutionally protected picketing. Once the Court ad-
mitted picketing as evidence of this other crime, the picketers were
doomed. In essence, the Court's syllogism amounted to the simple
and disingenuous claim that it was not enjoining peaceful picketing, it
was only enjoining an obvious conspiracy in restraint of trade. Even
Justice Hugo Black, the Court's most uncompromising defender of
the first amendment, approved of this rhetorical move. He later
wrote, in citing Giboney with approval, "where speech is an integral
part of unlawful conduct that is going on at the time, the speech can
be used [in evidence] to illustrate, emphasize and establish the unlaw-
ful conduct."13 This concession should alarm those who think Justice
Black's approach (or any definitional approach to the first amend-
ment) will prove sturdy enough to withstand the political winds. As
long as protected speech or conduct can be recast as evidence of some
other illegal conduct, no expressor will be safe. And there is little, if
any, practical difference between condemning speech or conduct out-
right, on the one hand, and granting it first amendment protection but
then treating it as evidence establishing other illegal conduct, on the
other hand.
Until the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell,14 the same rhetorical move was prevailing among the lower
courts in an important branch of defamation law. In that case, Jerry
Falwell sued Hustler magazine based on a parody it had published.
13. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 64 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
Despite the tone of the text, I do not mean to criticize the tack taken in Giboney, There may be
excellent reasons for condemning first amendment expression within the labor context. Justice War-
ren offered some in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617-18 (1969):
Any assessment of the precise scope of employer expression, of course, must be made
in the context of the labor relations setting .... Stating these obvious principles is but
another way of recognizing that what is basically at stake is the establishment of a non-
permanent, limited relationship between the employer, his economically dependent em-
ployee and his union agent, not the election of legislators or the enactment of legislation...
where the independent voter may be freer to listen more objectively and employers as a
class freer to talk.
My point is only that conduct which seems invulnerable in light of some judicial decisions can
be rendered vulnerable when recast as evidence of some other offense or civil wrong.
14. 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
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Hustler had clearly warned readers that the parody was fictitious and
was not to be taken as suggesting any facts, including, of course, any
facts that might defame Falwell. Apparently the jury took this warn-
ing as sincere, for they found that the parody could not be reasonably
understood to state any facts. To a faithful reader of past Supreme
Court opinions in similar disputes, this finding seemed fatal to
Falwell. The Court had held repeatedly that there is no such thing as
a false opinion and had seemed to require that the disparaging publi-
cation at least imply some false statement of fact before civil liability
could be imposed. 15 Even better for Hustler, the Court had required
since New York Times v. Sullivan,16 in 1964, that a public figure like
Falwell show not only that the statement of fact was false but also
that it was published with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disre-
gard of its falsity.
How did Falwell's attorney successfully avoid this hostile law in
the lower courts? He used our rhetorical move again-he told a dif-
ferent story. According to Falwell's attorney, those severe require-
ments, plainly fatal here, applied only to a suit for defamation. The
attorney described the magazine's behavior not as defamation but as
another tort, "intentional infliction of emotional distress."1 7 Accord-
ing to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the emotional distress
action in Falwell required an element not shared by the defamation
tort, namely, that the parody be "intended to cause emotional dis-
tress." 18 Because of this difference, the emotional distress tort was
not subject to the constitutional requirements for defamation; that the
ad was an opinion also became irrelevant. Once again the rhetorical
move erased the first amendment concerns. The elements of the emo-
tional distress tort, namely intent to cause emotional distress, outra-
geous conduct, and causing of severe emotional distress, could be
proven by constitutionally protected expression that could not be at-
tacked directly either through the criminal law or through the defa-
mation torts. You might think this recasting attempt too transparent
for a lower court to take seriously. You might think no adult, let
alone a judge, could attach significance, or could expect others to at-
15. See, eg., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Old Dominion Branch No.
496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing
Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1965).
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
17. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1272 (4th Cir. 1986), revd sub non Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988).
18. Flynt, 797 F.2d at 1274.
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tach significance, to this simple change in description. You might
think silly a legal regime that showers the world's rewards upon those
who recast behavior in this transparent way. You might find pathetic
the image of a judge, oblivious to the thrust of New York Times v.
Sullivan, gravely considering whether this parody satisfies each of the
three elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Yet, un-
til the Supreme Court decision, this rhetorical move had paid off
handsomely in case after case. One commentator aptly summarized
the attitude of the lower courts: "The incantation of the words 'inten-
tional infliction of severe emotional distress' appears to blind both
lawyers and judges to first amendment issues."19
This rhetorical move is not used merely to attack behavior that
might otherwise seem to be constitutionally protected. It is used to
attack various conduct that cannot be attacked when recast differ-
ently. A striking example appears in Tuttle v. Buck.2° In Tuttle, a
banker in Howard Lake, a Minnesota village, set up a barber shop,
hired the barbers, arranged with them to share the income from the
shop, and tried to increase business through lower prices and adver-
tisements. His success predictably reduced the income of the preexist-
ing barber shop in town, an expected result whenever an entering
business breaks up a local monopoly and brings to consumers the
blessings of rivalry. Tuttle, the injured barber, sued.
How do you suppose Tuttle described the behavior of the
banker? He could not successfully describe it as "setting up a barber
shop" or "going into business" or any other obviously legitimate ac-
tivity. He needed to find a description that would distract attention
from the fact that the banker had merely engaged in rivalry, the quin-
tessential conduct our free enterprise system encourages. The injured
barber thus described the banker's behavior as "maliciously en-
deavor[ing] to destroy plaintiff's said business. ' 21 The injured barber
relied on precedents which recognized as a tort "intentionally damag-
ing another without just cause or excuse."' 22 This tort shifts the bur-
den of production onto the defendant to prove "just cause or excuse."
Thus, this description of the banker's conduct enabled the plaintiff to
overcome the banker's demurrer, a major victory that enhanced the
19. Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words Intended to Inflict Severe Emo-
tional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1749, 1753 (1985).
20. 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909).
21. Tuttle, 119 N.W. at 946.
22. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 199 (1904).
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settlement value of his suit. At trial, the injured barber could have
introduced into evidence the uncontested facts about the banker's
conduct. That evidence may well have allowed the jury to infer that
the banker, like any new entrant, knew his entry would hurt a preex-
isting rival and, therefore, by entering with this knowledge, the
banker intended, perhaps maliciously, to hurt the rival. The absurd-
ity of imposing liability on the banker for the entrepreneurial initia-
tive our system cherishes only underscores the persuasive power of
this recasting move.
If a state court today is too sophisticated to accept Tuttle's rhe-
torical move, that court might yet allow Tuttle's action if we change
the facts to add another party who assisted the banker in his efforts.
For then the banker's actions become concerted, that is, conspirato-
rial, rather than purely unilateral. This allows Tuttle to tell the com-
mon law civil conspiracy story. Common law conspiracy requires
only that the defendants conspire, that is agree between themselves,
and that they conspire with an unlawful intent, such as the intent to
injure another. The actions taken by the conspirators need not be
unlawful independently. 23 The action for civil conspiracy justifies it-
self on the rationale that there is always danger in numbers. Other
business torts may likewise condemn conduct that everyone would
deem lawful and socially useful when recast independently, that is,
when viewed in itself, without reference to the actor's intent to harm
another or the fact that another was harmed. Intentional interference
with another's contract and intentional interference with another's
prospective business advantage, for example, have been interpreted in
a fashion that renders unimportant the decisionmaker's evaluation of
the defendant's conduct in itself.24
In antitrust law, this rhetorical move of recasting legitimate con-
duct in order to turn it into sufficient evidence of unlawful conduct
has paid dividends to plaintiffs' attorneys for almost a century. For
instance, the rhetorical move dominates the determination of whether
23. See, eg., Franklin Music Co. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 616 F.2d 528, 549 (3d Cir.
1979); Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,979; Houd
v. Palm, 8 Pa. 237, 239 (1848). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 293 (4th
ed. 1971); 8 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, THE COMMON LAW AND ITS RIVALS
385-92 (1926).
24. W. PROSSER & W.E. KEETON, TORTS § 129 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 766 (1982). See, e.g., Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 289 N.C. 71, 221 S.E.2d 282 (1976).
Indeed, in the United Kingdom the trend of courts is away from specific business torts which require
conduct wrongful in itself and toward a more general tort like "intentionally injuring another with-
out just cause." HEYDON, ECONOMIC TORTS 317 (1985).
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business conduct amounts to an attempt to monopolize in violation of
section 2 of the Sherman Act.25 On the one hand, the courts repeat-
edly state that the Sherman Act does not penalize vigorous, aggressive
rivalry. Instead, the Sherman Act is primarily directed against con-
duct like price-fixing which raises prices and reduces output by reduc-
ing rivalry. Mere vigorous rivalry, the courts insist, cannot amount to
an attempt to monopolize.2 6 Plaintiff's attorneys have circumvented
this rule, however, by persuading courts to identify the key, and in
some jurisdictions the sole, 27 element of attempt to monopolize as the
specific intent to monopolize. All too often juries are allowed to infer
this fatal specific intent from evidence of otherwise lawful, vigorous
rivalry combined only with the wish to hurt rivals that is a common-
place aspect of a rival's intent. The judicial opinions upholding these
verdicts typically reiterate the rule that such rivalry does not violate
the Sherman Act, but they then go on to say that the rule does not
apply when the jury finds that the defendant had a specific intent to
monopolize.28 Courts are unwilling to say that a defendant's vigorous
rivalry amounts to an attempt to monopolize. To say this would be
an embarrassingly obvious contradiction of the court's defense of such
rivalry. But courts are willing to let juries infer specific intent to mo-
nopolize from rivalrous conduct that the courts are unwilling to con-
demn in itself. Again, the rhetorical move whereby plaintiff's
attorney says, in effect, "I am not attacking vigorous rivalry, I am
attacking only those who specifically intend to monopolize" seems to
25. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) ("Every person who shall monopo-
lize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize ... shall be deemed guilty of a felony .... ").
26. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 622 (1953) (con-
duct predominately motivated by legitimate business aims is not the target of § 2); Pillar Corp. v.
Enercon Indus. Corp., 51 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1276, at 169 (July 21, 1986).
27. See, e.g., Greyhound Computer Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 559 F.2d
488, 504 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d
459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 933 (1964). But see Bushie v. Stenocord Corp., 460 F.2d 116,
119-20 (9th Cir. 1972) (retreating from Lessig by requiring at least "a substantial claim of restraint of
trade").
28. See, e.g., Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 627 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1980), cerL
denied, 450 U.S. 921 (1981); Knutson v. Daily Review Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 814 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8, 12 (9th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 933 (1964); Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodburg Corp., 57 F.2d 96, 102
(Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 552 (1932). Cf Aspen Sking Co. v. Aspen Highlands Sking Corp.,
472 U.S. 585 (1985) (Although a firm has no duty to engage in joint marketing with a rival, a jury
may infer that the firm's refusal to do so-accompanied by an exclusionary purpose--violates § 2 of
the Sherman Act.).
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blind judges. By letting juries infer an unlawful attempt to monopo-
lize based on evidence of such rivalry (combined with that inevitable
intent to prevail over rivals), judges are, in effect, condemning the
rivalry itself.29
Courts occasionally reject this rhetorical move and insist that
conduct lawful in itself cannot be sufficient evidence for some other
cleverly recast crime or civil violation. Usually when courts do so,
however, they simply accept defendant's recasting, that is, defendant's
innocent description, conceptualization and story, without acknowl-
edging any alternative recasting. As a result, the opinion goes right
past the losing attorney's recasting, never engaging it or joining issue
with it. This is unfortunate because a recognition of both recastings
could clarify the policy concerns that lead the court to prefer one to
another. By ignoring the other recastings, the other descriptions, the
opinion makes the issues and the results sound too simple. Consider
the Supreme Court opinion in Gregory v. City of Chicago.30 That case
arose out of a school desegregation dispute in Chicago in the mid-
1960s. Supporters of desegregation including the comedian, Dick
Gregory, were marching on a residential street. A hostile crowd lined
the street. Some people in the crowd threatened the marchers. The
police stepped in, demanded that the marchers disperse upon pain of
arrest, and when this command was not obeyed, arrested the march-
ers for disorderly conduct. A jury convicted the marchers and their
appeal of that conviction reached the Supreme Court.
Past cases supported the prosecutor's "story" of disorderly con-
duct. One precedent, Feiner v. New York, 31 involved a street corner
speech much like the woman's in our film excerpt. In Feiner, an ex-
cited crowd, including individuals hostile to the speaker, created (at
least in the policeman's mind), a danger of fighting and disorder. To
prevent the disorder the police arrested the speaker. Taking the "dis-
29. In general, the more vague the statutory prohibition, and the more the statute emphasizes
the result or end-state rather than the means or method to achieve that end-state, the easier it is to
use the statute for attacking behavior which cannot be attacked in itself. An act like the Sherman
Act is useful for this purpose because it emphasizes the end-state of "restraint of trade." One can
debate whether such acts as RICO and the mail fraud statute, which emphasize, respectively, a
pattern of racketeering activity and mail fraud, focus more on an end-state result or a method. But
thanks to their vagueness and sweep, those statutes can also be used to attack much conduct that has
not been attacked in itself by a more specific statute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (Sherman Antitrust
Act); 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
Act (RICO)); id. § 1341 (Mail Fraud).
30. 394 U.S. 111 (1969).
31. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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orderly conduct" story as the relevant story, the Supreme Court opin-
ion emphasized the danger of imminent disorder, that is, the effect of
the speech, and did not focus on the speaker's speech and conduct.
As a result the Court upheld Feiner's conviction for disorderly con-
duct, even though he had merely spoken and the only threat of vio-
lence came from the hostile crowd.32 Both Gregory and Feiner
involved a danger of imminent disorder from those hostile to the de-
fendant. In both, the police appealed in vain to the defendants to
desist. If anything, the speaker in Feiner engaged in a purer form of
speech than the marchers in Gregory, and thus was more entitled to
the Court's protection.
The Court in Gregory simply embraced a different story. It did
what I, as a beginning student, wanted a court to do. It asked itself
only whether the marchers' conduct was within the sphere of conduct
protected by the first amendment. That is, the Court embraced the
"protected expression" story. Under this story all attention focused
on the speaker and not on the consequences for public order. The
Court's four paragraph per curiam opinion shows how simple a case
becomes once a court embraces one story and ignores the others:
This is a simple case. Petitioners, accompanied by Chicago police
and an assistant city attorney, marched in a peaceful and orderly proces-
sion from City Hall to the Mayor's residence to press their claims for
desegregation of the public schools....
Petitioners' march, if peaceful and orderly, falls well within the
sphere of conduct protected by the First Amendment. There is no evi-
dence in this record that petitioners' conduct was disorderly. Therefore,
under the principle first established in Thompson v. City of Louisville,
convictions so totally devoid of evidentiary support violate due process. 33
The Court ignored Feiner and the other precedents that allowed pro-
tected speech to constitute some evidence of disorderly conduct that
when combined with evidence of disorder (from whatever source) suf-
ficed for a conviction. The Court rejected this "disorderly conduct"
story without the least nod of acknowledgement.
A few splendid opinions that reject this rhetorical move confront
the move expressly. Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Eastern
Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight34 is one. In
Noerr, a truck company sued a group of railroads for combining to-
32. Id. at 316-20.
33. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1969), (citation omitted).
34. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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gether to seek favorable legislation by lobbying the legislature and by
pursuing a public relations campaign against the truckers which was
aimed at the legislature.
Note the many recast stories that the railroads' action would al-
low. Sticking just to sections 135 and 236 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, the truckers told the stories "conspiracy to restrain trade" and
"conspiracy to monopolize" the long distance freight business. Then,
by emphasizing a more specific purpose of the railroads, the truckers
told the story "conspiracy for the sole purpose of destroying the
truckers as competitors for the long distance freight business." By
emphasizing the railroads' methods, the truckers told the story "con-
spiracy for the deception of the public, manufacture of bogus sources
of reference, and distortion of public sources of information."
An advantage of all these stories was that they could be accepted
without denying an individual acting alone the right to express his
opinion and to engage in lobbying activity without fear of antitrust
exposure. The truckers could claim that a ruling in their favor would
not infringe that right. After all, according to the truckers, the rail-
roads here were doing much more. They were combining to restrain
trade and to monopolize. Of course, these offenses would be inferred,
would be proven as an evidentiary matter, largely through testimony
and exhibits about how the railroad lobbyists expressed their opinion
to a legislature. But as we have seen, using protected conduct as evi-
dence of other unlawful conduct does not stop courts from insisting,
with a straight face, that the conduct remains protected.
This time, however, Justice Black blocked the first rhetorical
move forthrightly. He began innocently enough by repeating that
mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws were
lawful. But then he added that no violation of law could be "predi-
cated upon" such attempts. 37 The verb "predicated upon" is key
here. Saying that an offense cannot be predicated upon certain con-
duct says much more than that the conduct is lawful. It says further
that the conduct may not itself supply sufficient evidence of whatever
recasted offense or tort is alleged. Moreover, it suggests that the con-
duct should not even be admitted in evidence to prove some other
35. 26 Stat. 609 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1987) (condemning conspiracy in
restraint of trade).
36. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (condemning conspiracy to
monopolize).
37. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 135.
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offense. In that event, opposing counsel could not refer to the con-
duct and argue that the conduct shows the unlawful intent, the un-
lawful result, or any other element of whatever recast crime or tort is
alleged.
Alas, Justice Black did not go so far. To decide the case before
him, he merely needed to say that the concerted lobbying and public
relations efforts could not themselves supply sufficient evidence of an
antitrust violation. He left unclear whether such efforts could provide
some admissible evidence of a violation, which, when combined with
other evidence, might allow a jury to find a section 2 violation.38
The experienced attorneys for the truckers in Noerr then turned
to their second recasting of the railroads' action, namely a conspiracy
"to destroy the truckers as competitors for the long-distance freight
business. ' 39 This recasting had carried the day for the truckers in the
district court.4° But Justice Black met this move just as forthrightly.
He ruled that the railroad's efforts were protected even When under-
taken solely for such anticompetitive purposes.41
The truckers then turned to their recasting of the railroads' con-
duct as "deception of the public, manufacturer of bogus sources of
reference, [and] distortion of public sources of information. ' 42 At
first glance this move might seem to trap Justice Black. He would
hardly want to write that such deception is protected.
Plaintiffs' attorneys generally strive for a characterization of de-
fendants' conduct that is so undesirable that no court would possess
the courage to deem it protected. Here the move succeeded to that
extent; Justice Black would not say the deception was protected. In-
stead, he resorted to a narrow interpretation of the Sherman Act and
its prohibition of actions in restraint of trade. Despite adverse prece-
dents which he ignored,43 Justice Black interpreted the Act to regu-
late only actions of a business, and not a political, nature. Because he
38. Id. at 136.
39. Id. at 138. See also United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
40. Noerr Motor Freight v. Eastern R.R. President's Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'd, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
41. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139-40.
42. Id. at 140.
43. This interpretation ignored a host of cases in which the Sherman Act was used to regulate
actions that many would call political and that plainly implicate first amendment values. See, eg.,
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). Perhaps those prior uses of the Sherman
Act can be reconciled with Noerr if we assume Justice Black meant "political actions" to refer only
to actions taken to influence legislators directly. Admittedly, "political actions" would normally
carry a much broader meaning.
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characterized lobbying and public relation campaigns as actions of a
political nature, he held that the Sherman Act did not regulate
them.44
The importance of Justice Black's opinion lies in the extent to
which he was willing to afford what I call "safe harbor" treatment to
the conduct he wanted to protect. Safe harbor treatment means as-
suring that one who performs the harbored conduct will not increase
his legal exposure directly or indirectly. That requires assuring, at a
minimum, that the conduct can constitute neither an element of, nor
sufficient evidence to prove an element of, some charge. Going fur-
ther, safe harbor treatment should even preclude merely admitting the
conduct into evidence in order to prove an element of some charge.
At its most extreme, it might also preclude admitting the conduct in
evidence either to rebut other evidence, such as to impeach the testi-
mony of a witness, or to provide incidental background information.
There is a lesson for court-watchers here. How far along the
journey toward safe harbor treatment a court goes depends on how
much it supports the defendant's lawful conduct. Conversely, we can
measure the intensity of the court's support by observing how far it
goes. If a court holds certain conduct lawful but then allows the con-
duct to constitute the evidentiary predicate of some easily recast of-
fense, we know the court's support is unenthusiastic. Such a court is
merely giving lip service to the notion that the conduct is protected.
To return to the film excerpt, for instance, such a court might ac-
knowledge that the woman's speech was protected but then would
allow that speech in combination with factors outside her control, like
the disorder threatened by the crowd, to provide the evidentiary pred-
icate for "disorderly conduct". Indeed, that was the tack taken by the
Court in Feiner v. New York.45
A court slightly'more committed to first amendment values
might at least insist that the other evidence constituting the disorderly
conduct crime be within the actor's control. In that event, a disor-
derly conduct charge for the conduct in our film excerpt would not
get to the jury but a charge like "attempted breach of the peace" or
"incitement to riot" might, for the elements of those latter charges
might consist of her bad intent plus her speech, two matters within
her control. A court still more committed to first amendment values
might preclude these last two charges by ruling that a mere bad intent
44. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 142.
45. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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does not make a lawful act unlawful.46 But this court might yet allow
the conspiracy charges on the grounds that the required meeting of
the minds for a common purpose adds a separate element that is suffi-
cient. A court even more committed to first amendment values might
preclude the conspiracy charge by holding that protected expression
cannot constitute the overt act needed for the conspiracy charge or by
holding that the concerted conduct must itself be unlawful.
Courts still more committed to first amendment values will go
further and further toward the extreme position of complete safe har-
bor treatment. Be warned, however: a court will not state expressly
where along the continuum toward safe harbor treatment it has de-
cided to stop. A court may not even be conscious of the continuum.
More likely, it will just adopt one story, say the "incitement to riot"
story or the "protected expression" story, and ignore the others.
To summarize, the richer a culture's language, the more descrip-
tions of behavior it allows. Typically, a ruling that certain behavior is
lawful, or protected, applies to one or two but rarely to all the possible
descriptions of that behavior. A determined court or legislature can
still prohibit some descriptions of the behavior or, what amounts to
the same thing, some description that is logically evidenced by the
protected behavior. Whenever an opponent's behavior, protected or
not, will likely turn the factfinder against him, a lawyer should ad-
vance a description of the offense that renders the opponent's behav-
ior relevant evidence. If successful, he can claim to respect the
policies and principles that call for protecting the behavior and, at the
same time, he can exploit the behavior's prejudicial effect.
II. DEVELOPING THE ABILITY TO RECAST BEHAVIOR
If recasting behavior and other phenomena does not come natu-
rally to you, how do you help yourself to see the other arguable de-
scriptions? How do you develop your ability to move easily from one
configuration of phenomena to another? A self-conscious awareness
that you are striving for a different recasting is probably the first step.
Then consider the following hints.
A. Emphasizing Different Aspects of Behavior
One way to begin is to remember the different aspects of any
46. A line of cases supporting this position is discussed in Ames, How Far an Act May be a
Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 HARv. L. REv. 411 (1905).
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conduct that you can choose to emphasize. To oversimplify, you can
emphasize the actor's state of mind, the action's method, the manner
in which the method was carried out, the action's physical descrip-
tion, the number of actors, or the result, either immediately or
eventually.
Suppose you want to emphasize both the actor's state of mind
and the result, and you want to distract attention from either the spe-
cific method the defendant took or the physical description of the de-
fendant's action. Plaintiff's attorney might want to do this whenever
his client's case is helped by defendant's unkind state of mind and by
the result of defendant's conduct but not necessarily by defendant's
conduct itself. Perhaps plaintiff can begin the description of defend-
ant's conduct by focusing on that unkind state of mind and can com-
plete the description of defendant's conduct by focusing on the result.
This was just the tack taken in the Falwell case where Falwell's
attorney described Hustler's behavior as intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.47 This tort, this description of behavior, nicely dis-
tracts attention from Hustler's method. This was important to
Falwell's attorney because Hustler's method was merely the publica-
tion of a nonobscene and, therefore, constitutionally protected,
parody.
Note how well the "intentional infliction of emotional distress"
description emphasizes the actor's state of mind. More precisely, the
description emphasizes his state of mind about his action's effect on
the plaintiff. The description does not focus attention on the defend-
ant's state of mind in regard to the public or in regard to other laws,
other duties, or other ethical principles. In general, when a defendant
either wanted to hurt the plaintiff or knew that his action would prob-
ably hurt the plaintiff and went ahead anyway, you, as plaintiff's at-
torney, will want to conceive some description of defendant's behavior
that emphasizes this spite or, at least, this willingness to hurt. Simi-
larly, the plaintiff's attorney in Tuttle v. Buck 48 used this tack in
describing the banker's act of setting up a rival barber shop as "mali-
ciously endeavor[ing] to destroy [another's] ... business."4 9 Rightly
or wrongly, an attorney can still exploit our law's commitment to the
feudal notion that whoever intentionally hurts another should bear
the burden of justifying his act or pay.
47. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
48. 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909).
49. Tuttle, 119 N.W. at 946.
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Of course, the intentional infliction of emotional distress "de-
scription" also emphasizes the immediate result, emotional distress.
Plaintiff presumably wants to emphasize this result because he can
offer some evidence of such distress, as almost anyone can.
Notice the generality of the word infliction. The word "inflic-
tion" nicely suggests that the method of injury is unimportant. It in-
vites the reader to skim over the method, to slip by the.method with
little concern and thus to include within the cause of action almost
any method of causing emotional distress. The word distracts our
attention (almost unconsciously) from whether the method was ap-
propriate or inappropriate, normal or abnormal. One need not shoot
the plaintiff's children to inflict emotinal distress. One can inflict
emotional distress by not hiring or not retaining the plaintiff as an
employee, by telling the truth about the plaintiff, or by simply leaving
the plaintiff alone. The word infliction fixes attention solely on
whether the defendant intended to cause the plaintiff emotional dis-
tress and on the result, that is, whether such distress occurred.
Among the actions mentioned, disorderly conduct, breach of the
peace, intentional interference with another's contract, and inten-
tional interference with another's prospective business advantage
share a similar emphasis on the actor's state of mind and the result.
Having chosen to emphasize the state of mind and the result, you
may yet face a choice about which state of mind and result to empha-
size. You can emphasize the state of mind and result in the short-
term or in a longer term. For instance, "conspiring to overthrow the
government" focuses on a less immediate and a longer term purpose
and result of a speech than does "breach of the peace" or "incitement
to riot." "Attempting to monopolize" focuses on a less immediate
and a longer term purpose and result of a certain business action than
would "interfering with another's contract. '50
A few actions such as "restraining trade" come close to ignoring
all aspects of defendant's behavior except for the result.5 1 These I call
50. To help give meaning to the admittedly vague notion of short-term versus long-term intent,
consider the distinction philosophers draw between occurant or aroused intent and standing or latent
intent. An occurant or aroused intent is an intent currently in the actor's mind at the instant being
described. In contrast, a standing or latent intent is a disposition to have an occurant intent to this
effect. For instance, if John is now mowing the lawn, we might describe his occurant intent by
saying "John intends to finish mowing the lawn as quickly as possible." We might describe his
simultaneous standing intent by saying "John intends to become president of the company." See A.
GOLDMAN, A THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION (1970).
51. As the Chicago school uses the term, "restraining trade" does not mean interfering with
the process of rivalry but instead means any action that yields a certain result, namely, a reduction in
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"end-state actions." I believe they will become more common as utili-
tarian approaches to law, such as the economic approach, move
judges toward a greater emphasis on consequences.
In contrast such descriptions as unlawful advocacy, unlawful
picketing, selling below cost, and assault focus more on the actor's
specific method and the physical description of his conduct. These
are two aspects of defendant's conduct that I call, for ease of refer-
ence, defendant's conduct itself.
Recasting behavior to emphasize results and to de-emphasize the
conduct itself may represent an intellectual progression in a certain
sense. As a person develops from a child to an adult, he may progress
from viewing an act in terms of its concrete, physical aspects toward
viewing it in terms of its goals and results; first, its immediate goals
and results, and later, its more eventual ones. Consider these two ex-
amples of descriptions of the same act. The descriptions move pro-
gressively from an emphasis on the conduct itself to an emphasis on
its results.
1. The actor raised his arm.
2. The actor flipped a switch.
3. The actor turned on the light.
4. The actor illuminated the room.
5. The actor alerted a prowler to the fact that the actor was
home.
Also consider:
1. John moved his finger.
2. John pulled the trigger.
3. John fired the gun.
4. John killed Smith.
Notice the concrete verbs used in describing a physical action itself:
raise, lower, move, push and pull. To describe conduct in terms of its
results calls for a different set of verbs: illuminate, alert, or kill.
Learning to "think like a lawyer" may consist in part of a growing
ability to use a wide variety of verbs to emphasize less obvious, less
immediate, and less concrete aspects of any phenomena.
Philosophers have listed some of the different aspects of conduct
economic efficiency, also known as consumer welfare. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN Eco-
NOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976). To be sure "restraining trade" requires a conspiracy, that most ephem-
eral of all phenomena. Thus, the action fixes attention on the number of actors as well as on the
result.
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that we can choose to emphasize. In effect, their efforts supply a law-
yer with a checklist to guide his search for different descriptions of
behavior. I have altered the list of Nicholas Rescher, Professor of
Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, to adapt it for our
purposes:
1. Agent (who did it?)
2. Act-type (what did he do?)
3. Modality of Action (how did he do it?)
a. Modality of manner (in what manner did he do it?) e.g.,
firmly/weakly, rapidly/slowly, energetically/placidly,
gently/roughly
b. Modality of means (by what means did he do it?) e.g.,
did he open the curtain with the pull rope/with his
hands/with a stick/with this pull rope/with these
hands/with this stick
4. Setting of Action (in what context did he do it?)
a. Temporal aspect (when did he do it?)
b. Spatial aspect (where did he do it?)
c. Circumstantial aspect (under what circumstances did he
do it?)
5. Rationale of Action (why did he do it?)
a. Causality (what caused him to do it?) e.g., out of rage/
out of drunkenness/by an irrepressible urge/because of
post-hypnotic suggestion
b. Finality (with what aim did he do it?) e.g., out of ambi-
tion/out of concern for her feelings/out of a wish for
gain or advancement
c. Intentionality (in what state of mind did he do it?) e.g.,
voluntarily/involuntarily, deliberately/inadvertently, in-
tentionally/unintentionally, consciously/out of habit,
knowingly/unwittingly, willingly/unwillingly, gladly/re-
luctantly, confidentially/hesitantly
6. Evaluation
a. Of the act itself, e.g., prudently/rashly, considerately/
thoughtlessly, courteously/rudely, appropriately/inap-
propriately, recklessly/not recklessly, negligently/
carefully
b. Of the act in relation to other acts of the actor himself or
of people in general, e.g., typically/atypically, normally/
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abnormally, expectedly/unexpectedly, characteristi-
cally/unusually
7. Results
a. For other parties
b. For the actor himself
c. For society52
This outline suggests that one way to alter our descriptions of an ac-
tion is to juggle a limited and manageable number of distinctive as-
pects of the action. But while the aspects are limited in number, our
descriptions can change almost indefinitely.
B. Using Different Contexts
In describing conduct, a person is free not only to select which
aspects of conduct to emphasize, but also how wide a context to use.
Describing conduct within a wider context will often yield a richer,
more complex account of the actor's purpose. Indeed, I suspect that a
writer who is striving to indicate a more complex or more eventual
purpose will invariably widen the context. Consider the following de-
scriptions of the same act:
1. He raised and extended his left arm.
2. He extended his left arm out the car window.
3. He signaled for a turn.
4. He convinced his driver's education examiner that he was a
competent driver.
Consider further:
1. He writes his name on a piece of paper.
2. He writes a check.
3. He pays off a gambling debt.
Granted, these descriptions resemble the ones discussed earlier in that
they move from an emphasis on the act itself to an emphasis on the
result. Yet the descriptions also move from a narrower to a wider
context. We do the same thing when we describe the movements of
chess pieces not as K-+Nl and R-+Bl but as "castling," for then we
are describing an action in the context of the rules of the game. More
incorporation of context will necessarily yield a different, and usually
richer, description of action. 53 As lawyers you will want to develop
52. See N. RESCHER, Aspects of Action, in THE LOGIC OF DECISION AND ACTION 215 (N.
Rescher ed. 1976).
53. A.L. MELDEN, FREE ACTION 88 (1981).
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the ability to widen the context in order to give however rich a de-
scription will best suit your client.
A related advantage of widening the context is to give yourself
the option of describing either the intention to perform the precise act
or the intention to perform some broader category of acts of which
the precise act is only a specific example. To borrow an example
given by Mark Kelman,5 4 suppose a person cashing a check made out
to her tries to get more money from the bank by changing the num-
bers on the check. Her scheme fails because the letters on a check
control when a dispute arises between the numbers and the words.
How then do you describe her intent? If her intent is to perform the
precise act, you say she "intended to alter the numbers on a check."
This description acquits her of attempted forgery because forgery re-
quires a material alteration, and a mere alteration of the numbers is
not material.5 5 If you opt to describe the intent to perform a broader
category of acts, of which this precise act is only a specific example,
you say she "intended to receive money from the bank by altering an
instrument. '5 6 This second description of her intent helps the prose-
cutors immensely because it brings into play the well established prin-
ciple that the crime of attempt is committed when a person intended
to commit a crime and would have been guilty of the completed crime
if the facts had been as the defendant believed them to be. With the
latter description, the prosecutor can argue that the woman intended
to commit forgery and would have been guilty of the completed crime
if she had altered the instrument in a way that would have made the
bank pay her more money.57
C. Using Different Time Frames
You can also vary the time frame of your description. That is,
you can start the description either at the moment trouble breaks out
between the parties or at a moment far back in time long before
trouble breaks out, or at any point in between. For example, after a
fight on a football field, the player who threw the first punch in that
fight will justify his action by referring to the bad behavior of the
54. Kelman, Interpretive Constructs in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591,
621 (1981).
55. Wilson v. State, 85 Miss. 687, 38 So. 46 (1905). See generally Enker, Impossibility in Crim-
inal Attempts-Legality and the Legal Process, 53 MINN. L. REv. 665 (1969).
56. Cf. People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906).
57. See W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 60, at 442-43 (1972)
(discussing Wilson and Jaffe).
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victim earlier in the game or even in a previous game. Starting the
story of the fight from the moment the player threw the first punch
denies consideration to those earlier, provoking incidents. I would
call that a narrow time frame. The recent aggressor wants to open up
the time frame, that is, he wants a broader time frame that would
start the story from the beginning of the game or from the time in the
earlier game when the recent victim began his bad behavior. The re-
sulting story would not favor the recent victim as much. The battered
wife who shoots her husband when he comes home from work wants
a time frame broad enough to include the beating her husband admin-
istered before he went to work. But those prosecuting the wife for
murder want a narrow time frame that filters out of consideration
everything that happened earlier than a few moments before the
shooting.
Those like the battered wife who want to open up the time frame
are not merely asking the court to observe the earlier incidents. They
want more. They want the court to fuse earlier incidents, for example
the beating, with the later incidents, for example the shooting, into a
unified description of the wife's behavior, for example "self-defense
against assault or against spouse abuse." This illustrates why the at-
torney's job is to describe behavior, not merely to accept the descrip-
tion implied by a narrow time frame, for example "shooting her
husband", and to then ask that the earlier incident be noted in mitiga-
tion. In short, the defense attorney wants to describe the alleged
criminal behavior in a manner that will broaden the time frame and
fuse the earlier and later events while, ideally, emphasizing the earlier
events. The prosecuting attorney, in contrast, seeks a description that
narrows the time frame and that separates the earlier and later events
thereby rendering the earlier events irrelevant.
A person describing behavior can choose not only how much
time to include in his description but also the particular moment in
time to emphasize. The descriptions of behavior, that is, the story-
telling, that lawyers routinely present require a subtle shift in the mo-
ment emphasized. Consider a common nineteenth-century dispute in
which a railroad train ran over a rancher's cow. A story that empha-
sizes the moment of contact, the moment of injury, is likely to show
the railroad innocent of any negligence. There was probably nothing
cost justified that the railroad could do at or immediately before that
moment, especially if the engineer applied the brakes and blew the
whistle.
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The rancher's attorney must shift the moment of focus and look
for negligence earlier. Perhaps he could pinpoint the railroad's negli-
gence just a few moments earlier when the engineer failed to apply the
brakes or failed to blow the whistle as soon as he should have. Failing
that, he could pinpoint the negligence still farther back in time when
the lookout man failed to see the cattle, provided the cattle would
have been visible to one looking carefully. If the lookout man was
asleep or otherwise distracted, and thus failed to maintain a lookout,
the attorney can put the negligence at that moment when the lookout
let himself fall asleep or allowed himself to be distracted.
If the railroad decided not to employ a lookout, the attorney
could go further back in time and put the negligence at the moment
when the railroad made that decision. If that story still will not carry
the day, because maintaining a lookout would not be either financially
justified or required by statute, then he can jump further back in time.
He could point to the original decision to build the railroad with the
knowledge that the railroad would inflict this dangerous risk on the
rancher's cattle, a risk that is not eliminated by ordinary care. That
decision to proceed and to inflict deliberately on the rancher this sub-
stantial risk, he can argue, ought to subject the railroad to strict liabil-
ity when the risk materializes. According to this story, the organizers
of the railroad should view its future compensation to the rancher as a
cost factor to be incorporated into its decision to proceed with the
construction of the railroad. In each of these examples the moment of
focus changes, moving back in time from the moment of contact with
the cattle to the moment when the original entrepreneurs contem-
plated the possible costs of their prospective venture.
One group of legal academics, the "Chicago" school, has
achieved enormous influence by advocating a broad time frame in de-
ciding what statement of facts to take as the relevant one. The Chi-
cago school refuses to begin the relevant story at the moment trouble
breaks out between the parties, for instance, at the moment the rail-
road strikes the rancher's cow. Nor is the Chicago school content to
move back only to the moment the lookout fell asleep or the moment
the railroad decided not to hire any lookout to begin with. Rather,
following Roald Coase, 58 they begin their story much earlier-when
the prospective railroad and the prospective rancher might have first
bargained about how to reconcile their potentially conflicting activi-
ties. The Chicago school then asks courts to calculate what result the
58. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 36 (1960).
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parties would have arrived at had they been able to bargain costlessly.
Perhaps they would have bargained to the result that the railroad
need not pay for the cow provided it hired a lookout, or instead,
would have bargained to the result that the railroad would need to
pay as long as the rancher maintained a fence around his property.
Assuming that the cost of actually bargaining this way is high, the
court should simply prescribe these results and apply them to the case
before it. The result is to render irrelevant the circumstances sur-
rounding the moment of collision.
The Chicago school's insistence on viewing disputes ex ante
rather than ex post also implies a broad time frame and an early mo-
ment of focus. Under an ex ante approach, a judge would not take
the position of the parties at the time of trial as given and try to ap-
portion gains and losses fairly. Rather, the judge would go back in
time to search for the rules that would best encourage the parties to
engage in efficient behavior, and therefore, to maximize society's
wealth. For instance, when the licensee or user of a patented device
sues to restrict the patent holder's ability to collect royalties, the ex
ante approach does not consider the situation that exists and strive for
a fair result. Rather, it goes back to the time before the patented in-
vention existed and asks what rules will give the optimum incentives
for people to invent, provided the cost of promulgating and enforcing
those rules do not outweigh the benefits.59 Thus, the Chicago school
tells the legal profession: "Don't start your story when trouble breaks
out between the parties. Open up your time frame and go back to that
moment when the prospective parties with perfect foresight might
have rationally bargained to, or when certain legal rules might best
have encouraged, the efficient result."
The time frame of the Chicago school echoes a time frame em-
ployed generally by neoclassical economists in that centuries-old dis-
pute about the source of wealth. To argue that the source of wealth
lies in the willingness of private entrepreneurs to invest, neoclassical
economists like those in the Chicago school typically start their story
at the moment the entrepreneur confronts a primitive state of nature,
an empty prairie or an empty lot. With a view toward making a profit
by anticipating and meeting consumer demand, the entrepreneur
gambles his capital and starts construction of a factory and the other
steps in the production process. Society's increased consumption of
59. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term, Foreward: The Court and the Economic Sys-
tem, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10-12 (1984).
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goods and services-its increased wealth-then seems obviously to
spring from that investment.6°
In arguing that the source of wealth lay in the surplus value of
the worker's labor expropriated by the entrepreneur, Karl Marx used
a different time frame.61 He started his story not at the moment the
entrepreneurs confronted the state of nature but at the moment the
finished factory with its assembly line waits only for the workers to
tend it. Starting at that moment, Marx filters out everything that hap-
pened before. Thus, he begins his lengthy story with the wealth that
existed before the worker added his labor and ends his story with the
increased wealth that exists afterwards. From the total increase in
wealth, the reader is invited to subtract the wages of the worker and
to see the difference between the increased wealth and the wages as
the surplus value of the worker's labor which the entrepreneur has
extracted and now retains. With such a starting point, that surplus
value appears to be the key source of wealth.62
60. See, eg., id. at 27-29.
61. Karl Marx attributed the capital required to get the factory ready for the worker solely to
past labor and not even in part to the efforts or initiative of the entrepreneur. According to Marx,
there is "not one single atom of its value that does not owe its existence to unpaid labor". 1 K.
MARX, CAPITAL 637 (1919). See also T. SOWELL, MARXISM: PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 190-
95 (1985).
62. By adopting a different time frame, you can contrive alternative stories to the neoclassical
and Marxist stories about the source of wealth. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (1970). For instance, a model based on an even broader time frame than that used by
the neoclassical model might start the relevant story not when the entrepreneur gambles the capital
he has raised, but instead when the community or kinship group first opted for increasing efficiency
through specialization of labor, despite the hierarchies, unequal distribution of wealth and power,
and the other disadvantages that such specialization of labor would entail. This model would implic-
itly view the hierarchies and the unequal divisions of wealth and power that result from society's
drive for efficient production as necessary evils. Thus, the model suggests that managers and super-
visors, those put in charge by society's need for efficiency, owe certain obligations-beyond the mar-
ket wage-to those "specializing" in subservient roles. Accordingly, the claims of those who
succeed in the market to the unequal share of wealth and power that accompany their success need
not be seen as untouchable.
Thus, the model would call for some government interference with marketplace outcomes in
order to assure a more egalitarian distribution of wealth and power and in order to eliminate any
privileges not necessary for efficiency. Just as the neoclassical model emphasizes the need for opti-
mum incentives for entrepreneurs and investors, this model would emphasize the need to keep those
in subservient roles cooperative and free from resentment. On the other hand, unlike Marx's model,
this model might accept, in the name of increased efficiency, the authority of entrepreneurs and
managers to decide what is produced and how. The model would invite us to see society as an
organism consisting of interdependent parts, each of which is essential to the organism's success.
Admittedly, this model echoes the corporate view of society long associated with feudalism and
catholicism. The model would not highlight exclusively the marginal effect of government actions
on the incentives of an entrepreneur, but would also direct attention to the marginal effect of govern-
ment actions on the willingness of others to assist, tolerate, and cooperate with the entrepreneur.
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This example suggests that recasting behavior does not merely
allow you to argue clusters of facts into or out of various tort, crimi-
nal, and other legal categories. It allows you to inculcate others with
your interpretation of experience generally. In telling your stories,
therefore, consider the different time frames you can choose. Pick
your starting and ending points purposely and judiciously.63
D. Expanding and Collapsing Behavior
Closely related to our choice of a starting and ending point and
to our choice of how much context to provide is our choice of whether
to expand or collapse behavior. We collapse behavior by lumping to-
gether the various different steps in the behavior. We expand behav-
ior by emphasizing each of those steps. The torts scholar Clarence
Morris illustrates this rhetorical move" in his description of Hines v.
Morrow.65 In Hines, the defendant negligently left a mudhole in a
highway. A third party's car drove into it and got stuck. The plain-
tiff, a man with a wooden leg, came along, and after some discussion,
attempted to pull the third party's car out of the mud with a tow rope.
The plaintiff's wooden leg got stuck in the mud. The plaintiff took
hold of the tailgate of the tow truck in order to extricate himself. As
the tow truck moved, a loop in the tow rope lassoed his good leg and
broke it.
The issue was whether the defendant's negligence in leaving the
mudhole in the highway should be held to be the proximate cause of
the plaintiff's broken leg. The proximate cause issue would normally
turn, in part, on the extent to which defendant should have foreseen
that his conduct created an unreasonable risk of what occurred. Pro-
fessor Morris attributed the decision for plaintiff to this summary of
the facts in plaintiff's brief: "The case stated in briefest form is simply
this: Appellee was on the highway, using it in a lawful manner, and
slipped into this hole, created by appellant's negligence, and was in-
63. The philosopher Stanley Fish believes people can never consciously choose to use a broad
or narrow time frame in describing phenomena. He believes the time frame, like the other interpre-
tive constructs, are "a condition of consciousness" that is "already-in-place" for every lawyer who
confronts a particular phenomena. He believes we can never distance ourselves from the uncon-
scious choices that particular time frame represents. We can never choose an alternate time frame.
In short, Fish claims you can never make the choices that I believe every self-conscious lawyer
seeking to persuade a decisionmaker makes routinely. Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory,
96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987).
64. Morris, Proximate Cause in Minnesota, 34 MINN. L. REV. 185 (1950).
65. 236 S.W. 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
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jured in attempting to extricate himself."'66 This statement of facts
nicely collapsed several distinct events, thereby making plaintiff's in-
jury seem a natural and foreseeable consequence of defendant's action
in failing to fix the mudhole. By collapsing the event, plaintiff's attor-
ney took advantage of the favorable feature that the injury came
about while his client was trying to extricate himself and emphasized
that feature alone while ignoring such unforeseeable (and thus unfa-
vorable) circumstances as his wooden leg, the presence of the tow
truck, the use of the tow rope, his grabbing hold of the tailgate of the
tow truck and the tow rope lassoing his healthy leg.
In contrast, defendant's attorney in trying to expand the event
would have told a much longer story. That story would have empha-
sized each distinct event and would have emphasized the improbabil-
ity of each unlikely event following the previous improbable events.
Thus, defendant's story would implicitly invite the reader to multiply
together the small chance of each event occurring and to conclude
that the chance of all these events occurring one after another is re-
mote indeed.
Sometimes a plaintiff wishing to show proximate cause will ex-
pand the number of facts. Professor William Prosser provides the ex-
ample of the decedent who scratched his finger on a chipped milk
bottle that the defendant had left on his doorstep. 67 A collapsed story
might say that "the defendant left a glass milk bottle with a slight
chip near the top on the plaintiff's doorstep and the decedent perished
as a result." Since the death of the customer seems so unforeseeable a
result of defendant's negligence in using an imperfect milk bottle, this
collapsed story favors the defendant. Therefore, plaintiff's attorney
wants to describe how naturally each of the distinct events leading to
his client's death followed from the one before it. When each event in
the sequence of events appears foreseeable, the ultimate result will
seem more foreseeable. Thus plaintiff's attorney might expand the
story as follows: "The decedent picked up a defective milk bottle that
defendant negligently left on his doorstep. In the lifting process,
plaintiff scratched a finger. The scratch became infected and the in-
fection led to blood poisoning (before penicillin). This resulted in the
decedent's death." This description takes advantage of the fact that
66. Morris, supra note 63, at 193.
67. W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at 375 (6th ed. 1976) (discussing Koehler v. Waukesha Milk
Co., 190 Wis. 52, 208 N.W. 901 (1926)).
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the manner by which defendant's negligence led to his client's injury
was foreseeable even though the resulting death was not.
E. Using Different Perspectives
You might consider how you can change a description of events
by changing the perspective slightly. Consider the following possible
descriptions of the same simultaneous act of moving a piece in a chess
game from one square to another:
1. The actor chases away a fly.
2. The actor checkmates his opponent.
3. The actor gives his opponent a heart attack.
4. The actor proves to himself that he can learn chess
successfully.
All four descriptions focus on the result of an act. Nevertheless, they
vary based on which result you wish to emphasize. Different possible
results are seen by moving the perspective from one person or event to
another. You can describe the result for the fly, for the game itself,
for the health of the actor's opponent, or for the actor himself. Some
results may seem incidental, like the chasing away of the fly, because
we just don't care about the perspective of, or result for, the fly. In
our film excerpt, we might help ourselves see the other possible de-
scriptions by taking the perspective of the various people affected.
From the policeman's perspective, the important result was the possi-
ble disorder or riot. To the passerby, it was the blocking of the path.
To the park's maintenance crew, it was littering.
F. Using Different Degrees of Specificity
You can also expand or collapse your description by changing
the degree of specificity with which you describe behavior. Thus, the
same act can be described as follows:
a) sawing wood;
b) sawing a wood plank;
c) sawing an oak plank; or
d) sawing one of Smith's oak planks.
You can augment the description of an act by indicating how the act
is performed: slowly, quickly, or loudly. In describing how the act is
performed, you can vary the degree of specificity as well: loudly ver-
sus a squeaking noise; quickly versus three thrusts per second. Such
descriptions can merge well into the evaluation of the conduct that
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you want the decisionmaker to accept. To take an extreme example,
the attorney for someone injured by defendant's sawing can add the
word "carelessly" to his description of how the defendant sawed the
wood. This is a heavy-handed example because the attorney is obvi-
ously sneaking an evaluation into what purports to be merely a fac-
tual description of the conduct. The adverb "carelessly" is so similar
to the legal conclusion "negligently" that the attorney betrays his rhe-
torical maneuvering.
In sum, when you view conduct, ask yourself which aspects of it
you wish to emphasize. Do you wish to emphasize the state of mind
of the actor? Do you wish to emphasize that the action was deliberate
or accidental? Do you want to emphasize that the motive was intent
to harm another, thereby suggesting spite? Or is the motive one that
is approved, as in self-defense? Or perhaps you wish to emphasize
how the action was performed, that is negligently or recklessly? Was
the action done alone? If not, you can emphasize the plurality of ac-
tors by alleging conspiracy. Were others approached by the actor? If
so, you can emphasize this aspect by using the "soliciting," "incite-
ment," and "inducement" actions.
Do you want to emphasize what the action amounts to physi-
cally, an aspect emphasized by such descriptions as "exceeding the
speed limit," or "failing to buckle a seat belt?" Or do you want to
emphasize the result, the tack taken by such claims as infliction of
emotional distress. If you don't wish to emphasize the immediate
purpose or result, consider emphasizing the purpose or result that oc-
curs over a longer time period. When do you want the story to start?
When do you want it to end? In how wide a context do you want to
set the behavior? How complex a purpose or result should you de-
scribe? Through whose eyes should the result be described? In
describing the conduct, what level of specificity, that is, how much
detail, should you use? Do you want your description to expand or
collapse the conduct?
The insight that phenomena can be described, can be shaped, so
many different ways is liberating. It gives you power by giving you
options. It also foists upon you the responsibility of selecting among
those options shrewdly and carefully.
Our judgment about which description to use will naturally de-
pend on whatever we want the decisionmaker to think is important
about the conduct. In general, our choice of descriptions represents a
choice about what is important. When judges describe conduct by its
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results, as in the crime of price-fixing, the judges are really saying that
that result dwarfs in importance the particular method used, which
here may be purely speech, for example, one executive saying to an-
other on the telephone, "let's raise prices two dollars on Monday,"
and the other replying, "okay." Recasting to distract attention from
certain aspects of behavior is just a shorthand way of saying that
those aspects are not important.
If you are revolted, as I am, by a recasting of what our speaker in
the film excerpt did as "disorderly conduct" with the result that the
audience's hostility justifies throwing her in jail, that is only because
we feel such a recasting insufficiently values her freedom of speech
and improperly shifts onto her the responsibility for the actions of the
hostile members of the crowd. We are not able to claim seriously that
this recasting is inaccurate or wrong in any absolute or objective
sense.
By seeing the different ways conduct can be described, we save
ourselves from asking "which story is true?" or "which description is
correct?" Those are questions for children. As long as our descrip-
tion does not, for instance, emphasize an aspect of the phenomena
that the phenomena simply does not display (the redness of the sun
when the sun was invisible, or the wish to hurt the plaintiff when
there was no wish), our description is neither right nor wrong, but
only more or less persuasive to the decisionmaker. After all, each
description can only give a partial picture, a highly selective picture.
CONCLUSION
Seeing the different ways conduct can be described suggests sev-
eral conclusions about the law itself. The legal realists would say it
suggests the indeterminacy of the law. At least it undermines our
confidence in the ability of legal doctrine to withstand the political
winds. It warns us against assuming that legal doctrine will ever pro-
vide secure protection. By showing that legal doctrine rarely deter-
mines results, the legal realists also press us to replace doctrine as the
determining factor with the policy arguments of which the realists are
so fond.
In theory, past cases can limit the ways stories can be told. They
may, for instance, indicate the time frame to be used in describing
certain behavior. If the Supreme Court should adopt a definitional
rather than a balancing approach to an issue, that decision may limit
the time frame and the amount of context one can use. For instance if
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the Court rules that one who shows a movie can't be jailed based on
the content of the movie unless the movie itself is "obscene" and fur-
ther rules that only four factors can be considered in determining
whether the film is "obscene," that decision will limit the prosecutor's
choices about which time frame and how wide a context to use in
describing what the movie exhibitor did.68 Few cases enforce such
limits, however. Because judges are so often content merely to decide
the dispute before them and explain that decision cogently, their rules
typically give the clever recaster more room to maneuver. 69
The conclusion I suggest concerns the status of our legal dis-
course. Despite a good deal of populist grumbling, we still give our
legal discourse an exalted status. Some of us even speak of legal sci-
ence. We pride ourselves on our close analytical analysis that rejects
generalizations or approximations. We think our legal discourse, and
that of other developed nations of the West, marks our cultures as
civilized. For many, that pride in our legal discourse amounts to
more breath into that ever-expanding balloon of Western pomposity
and smugness. To see legal reasoning and argument as mastery over
a handful of rhetorical moves punctures that balloon. It deflates our
legal discourse back to the level of ordinary political and literary dis-
course-in short, back to the level of the rest of the world. Why then
our law schools? How then justify our status and our fees? On what
then does our system's prominence rest?
68. See Freeman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). But see State v. Rabe, 79 Wash. 2d 254,
484 P.2d 917 (1971) (lurid but non-obscene content of film deemed relevant evidence that outdoor
exhibtion of film invaded privacy of residents in adjacent homes, rendering film obscene in context),
rev'd on other grounds, 405 U.S. 313 (1972).
69. Granted, there is more to legal argument than telling the most persuasive story. Usually
the lawyer will still need to sell his story. A host of sources may supply helpful arguments for this
purpose, although policy arguments seem most in fashion. As others have asserted, these policy
arguments are "little more than slogans or formulas currently acceptable in legal discourse." Ma-
cauley, Law Schools and the World Outside Their Doors I. Some Notes on Two Recent Studies of the
Chicago Bar, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 506, 517 (1982). In choosing which policy arguments to rely upon,
just as in choosing which story to tell, your political instincts may guide you better than will any-
thing you learn in law school.
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